The role of commercial bank lending in financing the farm production sector is an issue of growing importance. During the past several years, farm operators have become more capital intensive, thus requiring more loans to fund not only seasonal plantings but also capital expansion. While one area of research (Linsj Penson; Hesser 'and Schuh) has focused on the determinants of aggregate loan demand, subsequent work (Boehlje and Fisherj Boehlje, Harris and Hoskins) has concentrated on such demand in local financial markets. Despite this re search on financial market behavior, relatively little has been done to model and empirically test the decision process of individual lending officers in this market. Existing studies (i.e., Barry, Baker, and Sanint; Sonka, Dixon, and Jones).have concentrated primarily on.credit analysis of farm firms. The objective of this paper is to expand on existing research by incorporating the inter acting effects of credit considerations, market conditions, collateral and pricing into the decision process of the individual loan officer when faced with an array of farm loan situations. The role of commercial bank lending in financing the farm production sector is an issue of growing importance. During the past several years, farm operat ors have become more capital intensive, thus requiring more loans to fund not only seasonal plantings but also capital expansion. While one area of research (Linsj Penson; Hesser 'and Schuh) has focused on the determinants of aggregate loan demand, subsequent work (Boehlje and Fisherj Boehlje, Harris and Hoskins) has concentrated on such demand in local financial markets. Despite this re search on financial market behavior, relatively little has been done to model and empirically test the decision process of individual lending officers in this market. Existing studies (i.e., Barry, Baker, and Sanint; Sonka, Dixon, and Jones).have concentrated primarily on.credit analysis of farm firms. The objec tive of this paper is to expand on existing research by incorporating the inter acting effects of credit considerations, market conditions, collateral and pricing into the decision process of the individual loan officer when faced with an array of farm loan situations. A sample of agricultural loan officers were asked to evaluate hypothetical situations derived from the theoretical model described in the next section. These simulated loans were generated from" a set of factorially designed combinations of decision variables. Conjoint measure ment is then employed to empirically analyze this decision process.
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Theoretical Model
This paper studies the determinants of lenders' ranking of loans. Since the loan size is controlled, the following discussion will focus on the loan of a dollar. By suitable scaling, the utility model will apply to any pool of loan applications, each for A dollars. The characteristics of the loan examined in this study are: collateral, yield, farm management, repajnnent ability, market conditions, and loan purpose.
Denote by c the collateral on the,loan, and by r, the yield. Let x be the cash payments from the borrower to the lender over the period of the loan. Then the return to the lender, R, can take either one of two forms. First, the loan does not perform, in which case the lender gets the collateral plus whatever cash payments, x, occur prior to default. Otherwise, the loan performs, and the lender gets back his principal 1 and interest r. Thus, the return function for the lender, R(x), equals the minimum of c + x and 1 + r. This is depicted in Figure 1 . Note the crucial value ofx=l+r-c;at this value, a loan is just on the. verge of performing. Now if X were certain it would be an easy matter for the bank to rank loans: good loans perform, bad loans do not. In most cases, however, x is random. Indeed, the randomness of x is typically contingent on the remaining four features: farm management, the borrowing farm's repayment ability, market conditions, and loan purpose.
Let
= management capability of the borrowing farmer; = repayment ability of the farmer;~market conditions facing the farmer; z^-compliance of the loan with the lender's loan policy. The conditional probability rela tionship for X given levels of the z's will be denoted by fCx/Zj^jZ^jZ^jZ^) .
The z's are measured in such a way that an increase in any z should shift the conditional probability to the right. Better farm management, for instance, should raise the probability that a loan will perfprm. This is depicted in Figure 2 . To avoid trivialities, we assume that there is always some probabil ity of non-performance. Denoting by F(x/z jZ^cumulative probabil ity distribution, then,' l>F(l+r-c/zjZ^,z^)>0. Finally, the attitude of the lender towards risk must be considered.
If the lender's utility function is linear, U(R) = R for return R, then the lender is risk-neutral.^The expected utility of a loan to a risk-neutral lender E(R/Z) is given by:
The first term on the right-hand side of (1) is the expected value of the collateral,.that is, the collateral times the probability of collecting the collateral when the loan does not perform. The second term is the expected default value of the farm project, given that the project does not perform as a loan and hence the lender collects all the proceeds prior to default. The third term is the expected value of the loan, given that it does perform, that is the principal plus interest times the probability of receiving them.
Mathematically one can show that increases in any of the 6 features increase the expected return to the lender; that is
This is illustrated by a special case in the Appendix. Loan purpose also exerts an influence on the evaluation process. Banks maintain both external and internal loan policies. A typical external policy is to focus on economically productive loans which promote growth and viability in the bank's agricultural market area. This external goal is supplemented by internal objectives vjfhich include the generation of a loan portfolio that is not only profitable but also is consistent with the bank's overall strategy. Since banks are not observed to be single period profit maximizers, a productive loan can be considered as one in which a long-term profitable relationship with a borrowing farmer is established or maintained.
Repayment of principal is defined in terms of the ability of the borrowing farmer to meet his debt service requirements which include both interest and principal. Gabriel and Baker employ a similar definition when examining finan cial risk and how it is affected by changes in business risk, Repajrment ability has been examined within more restrictive analytical models (Hanson and Thompson; Sonka, Dixon and Jones). Specific repayment alternatives are more likely affected by the nature of the farmer's financing need. The many alterna tive borrowing farm situations are difficult to assess effectively and hence are not tested in this study. Therefore, a more general definition is employed.
All-in-yield terms, which include both the base rate, as well as possible, compensating balances, and required collateral compose the pricing component of the decision process. Compensating balances may be considered as part of the loan-price vector even though they are virtually non-existent in agricultural lending. Finally, the excess of the market value of pledged security over the loan amount,, coupled with the liquidity of the collateral, determines the lender's margin of safety in case of default. Attractive collateral must first be liquidated quickly without depressing prices. In addition, the greater the 7 fluctuation in its market value, the less desirable is collateral to the lender.
Therefore, preference would be for greater liquidity and certainty of value.
Each attribute was measured on three levels (see Table 1 ), resulting in a total of 27 combinations based on a fractional factorial design (see Addelman).
The fractional factorial design was constructed so that all two-way interaction effects among price, management, and collateral could be estimated. The remain ing interaction terms were confounded.
The six-attribute preference model related to,the fractional factorial design is as follows: All 44 subjects were given an identical deck of cards containing descriptions of hypothetical loans in terms of the six attributes, which were based upon the fractional factorial design.
The frame of reference to be used by the loan officer was that an application for an agricultural loan was being considered.
The subjects were told that the hypothetical loans differed only with respect to the 6 attributes and were identical in all other factors. Based on previous research,.these other conditions include loan size, maturity, bank portfolio conditions, and whether the borrowers were existing versus new customers.
The subjects were instructed to sort the cards in order of preference from the most preferred loan situation to the least preferred loan situation.' Standard sorting instructions were given to the subjects.
B. Aggregate Results
Based on equation (4), OLS regression was used to estimate the aggregate utility model. These pooled regression results are presented in Table 2 . With an r2 of .743 for the main effects model, the explanatory results indicate a highly acceptable amount of homogeneity among the participants. All of the main effects coefficients are significant at the .01 level. Furthermore, none of the two-way interactions among management collateral and price are statistically significant. Consequently, only the main effects are interpreted and discussed.
Using the coefficients for equation (4), the part-worths of equation (3) can be calculated. Table 3 shows the resulting part-worths and aggregate util ity functions. Both the relative magnitude and direction of the aggregate func tions can be observed.T he direction of the utility functions are consistent with expectations as specified. However, the results also suggest that the participating lending t officers tended to weigh more heavily the negative influence of all the decision variables. For example, it appears that poor farm management has-a greater negative influence on the loan decision than the opposing effect of good manage ment. Such, results could reflect organizational factors generally applicable to banking. First, the default of a major loan is more costly than the opportunity cost of .denying a good loan. Less obvious, but probably equally as important, career rewards and penalties for agricultural lenders may be asymmetrically biased toward the avoidance of problem loans. If so, the loan officer would attempt to avoid mistakes even though possibly excellent loan prospects may be denied. Third, given the limited return for loans tied only to a debt rate,, the loan.officer must find a means to reject loan applications; thus, a negative variable takes on additional importance. Also, given that a majority of the information from the farm borrower is positive, a negative factor' takes on added importance. Finally, avoiding non-productive loans is a prime item on a good amount of agricultural loan officers' experience and training. Such training may enforce a better understanding of denying loan applications than accepting them. While these reasons have not been empirically validated, they are con sistent with the role of negative information in other negotiating contexts.
The range of the part-worths for each attribute can be interpreted as an index of the relative importance of the attribute as a determinant of the utility of the stimuli. Examination of the part-worth ranges in Table 3 indi cates the farm management variable is the most important attribute although it is not dominant. Repayment assurance and collateral are next in the influencing of the preference of the loan officers for specific credit situations. Both loan policy and yield are considerably less important.
The relative magnitudes of the part-worths can be examined in terms of potential backoffs in the loan decision. For example, the influence of poor management can be offset by high repayment assurance and collateral. However, conversely,-excellent management is not enough to compensate for insufficient evidence of good repayment ability and collateral. The nature of these rela tionships confirms the lack of importance of pricing in this decision process.
The role of yield has little influence on the outcome of individual decision processes, which is similar to the conclusion reached by Barry, Baker and Sanint, Finally, market condition is the least important decision variable.
While stability of the agricultural market is preferred, the results suggest that the current state of the agricultural market was not important in how the loan officers ranked the remaining decision variables.
Summary
The principal interest of this paper has been to examine the agricultural lending process using a more complete set of decision variables. The empirical testing of a model of a lender's multiattribute utility function confirmed the hypothesized relationships. Furthermore, the main effects model was sufficient to explain the decision process.
Two specific results are pertinent to future research into this process.
First, the role of management which had been examined in more restrictive models in previous research is confirmed by the results of this study. However, impor tant insight is provided into the interaction among a more complete set of decision variables for agricultural lending than is 'normally accorded in agri cultural finance texts. In this context, there was a lack of responsiveness of loan interest rate to varying levels of the credit risk considerations. These results could be explained by a combination of plausible reasons. Given the strong influence of other decision variables such as farm management ability and repayment potential, the interest rate is locked in. Furthermore, the range of yield alternatives is relatively narrow. While yield may have been more of a factor in the decision if the range was wider, competition among financial institutions tends to restrict such a range. Second, loan officers appeared to have placed a greater emphasis on the negative effect of tl^ese variables which suggests a prior inclination to deny the farm loan application. While several reasons for this were suggested, this remains an area of future research.
1. Obviously, if the lender's utility function is strictly concave, and U(R) exhibits a positive but diminishing marginal utility, risk aversion can be illustrated. However, even with this alternative function, it continues to be explicitly conditional of Z and implicitly on c and v.
2. Recent empirical research indicates conjoint measurements are characterized by high predictive utility and measurement stability (for example, see Moore) .
3. A fractional factorial design was necessary to make the number of treatment combinations small enough to be manageable. A full factorial design would have consisted of 3^or 729 combinations.
The loan officers' preference ratings consisted of rank order judgments.
The dependent variable, therefore, was measured on an ordinal scale. "Recent evidence indicates metric analysis of variance or ordinary least squares (OLS) regression procedures are robust in conjoint measurement applications.
Consequently, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis using effects coding was used to estimate the part-worth functions in this study. .117 (M«) .615(M2) Pi=-(P2+P3); Ri=-(R2+R3); Ci-(C2+C3); Yi=-(Y2+Y3).
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